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By the mid-1990s, a set of standards concerning minority protections emerged from elite-level dialogue between European states, particularly within the forums provided by international institutions.  Developing a post-Cold War minority rights ‘regime’ was thought to be critical, particularly for Western elites, in stemming population flows westwards precipitated by emerging ethnic tensions.  Post-Cold War standards have been delineated within key agreements of the two organizations most involved in the development of a new minority rights regime:  the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (COE).  These include the OSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen Document and 1991 Geneva Report as well as the COE’s 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.  Post-Cold War ‘European’ norms ultimately include the following principles:  (1) the notion of identity being an individual’s choice;​[1]​ (2) the idea that ‘individuals belonging to national minorities’ should have unimpeded access to human rights accorded to all individuals;​[2]​ (3)  the idea that they must free from state-sponsored discrimination and share equality before the law;​[3]​ (4) the right to maintain and develop minority culture privately and publicly;​[4]​ (5) the right to form contacts with foreigners of the same cultural background;​[5]​ (6) the right to charge their respective governments of violating the above in European-wide forums;​[6]​ and finally responsibility for (7)  demonstrating loyalty to the states individuals belonging to national minorities call home.​[7]​  
Normative pressure and membership conditionality have been the two methods of bringing these norms to Central and East European countries (CEECs).​[8]​  Used to the greatest extent by the OSCE, normative pressure or socialization involves efforts to get CEEC elites to change policy in line with post-Cold War norms without making membership conditional on doing so, relying instead on various forms of persuasion.  Since the OSCE admitted most CEECs relatively quickly after 1989 and several during the Cold War, this institution has been resigned to rely primarily on normative pressure.  Beyond creating the post of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE HCNM) in December 1992 as a conflict prevention measure, one that helped raise the organization’s profile once the EU began to consult the OSCE HCNM on a regular basis, the OSCE used other means to influence minority policy that fit within the rubric of normative pressure:  (1) the establishment of field offices (or missions) within countries thought to have the potential for conflict to monitor treatment of minorities and to interact regularly with officials, (2)  short-term visits by experts and/or elites from other OSCE member states to determine the extent to which these countries have adopted policies in line with OSCE guidelines,​[9]​ (3) declarations and official statements evaluating current policies that might also indicate recommendations for future changes as well as the formal statement of norms in official documents such as the Copenhagen Document or the Framework Convention, and (4) dispatching teams of legal experts to provide advice during the policy-making process.​[10]​  Particularly unique to the OSCE’s methods has been the establishment of missions that bring a small number of people in to work on a daily basis with local officials on a variety of issues  --  not merely concerning human and minority rights, but also on topics such as strengthening independent judiciaries, the rule of law, and independent media.​[11]​
	Conditionality, on the other hand, has been used more by the COE and especially the EU  --  though the former also used normative pressure to coax CEECs to adopt policies in line with post-Cold War norms.  Conditionality creates greater incentives to change given linkages to membership in Europe’s most prominent international institutions.  EU conditionality has involved:  (1)  promises of aid and trade preferences,  (2)  monitoring and benchmarking (i.e. the submission of yearly progress reports that rank applicants’ success in meeting membership requirements, other reports and decisions made at meetings requiring specific action by candidates, evaluations prior to formal accession negotiations to identify discrepancies between EU and national law), (3)  accession negotiations that involved deliberations over 31 chapters as well as ongoing benchmarking and monitoring,​[12]​ and (4)  declarations from the Presidency and resolutions from the European Parliament along with other official declarations and demarches urging reform.​[13]​  
Given that COE membership became a de facto prerequisite for joining the EU by 1993, CEECs were keen to follow through on promises made to join even after they became member states.  Paradoxically, the EU has had the most leverage to achieve CEECs compliance with post-Cold War norms on minority rights while having the least involvement in the construction of the regime.  While the OSCE and COE were actively involved in its development in the early 1990s, it was not until the EU’s statement of the 1993 ‘Copenhagen criteria’ for membership that some emphasis on minority rights emerged.  The three primary conditions included:  (1)  the existence of stable democratic institutions including rights, respect for, and protection of minorities as well as the rule of law; (2) the presence of a market economy capable of withstanding competitive pressures; and (3) the ability to take on all of the requirements that come with membership, including monetary, economic, and political integration.​[14]​  
Existing scholarly work on international institutions’ impact on minority rights policy in post-Cold war Central Europe tends to focus on two interrelated questions:  (1)  what explains the variation in the extent to which elites/governments harmonize minority/citizenship policies with European norms?,​[15]​ and speaking more theoretically (2)  what are the underlying causes for why norms are adopted in the first place  --  actors’ interests or identity?​[16]​  Concerning the former, the insightful work of Judith Kelley has gone far in helping to understand the variation in outcomes.  A recent article explores three factors with the potential to impact overall domestic elite preferences:  (1)  the extent of domestic opposition to minority protections in government and parliament, (2) authoritarian-style leaders, and (3)  the extent to which ethnic minorities have representatives in government and parliament.​[17]​  Beyond noting the same variables, her methodologically sophisticated contrast of conditionality and socialization’s impact in four CEECs (Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, and Romania) shows that conditionality has ultimately been more effective in bringing about elite behavior change than normative pressure.​[18]​  When domestic opposition exists to adopting the post-Cold War minority rights regime, socialization lacks conditionality’s leverage, a form of influence that more often alters elite behavior and leads to the regime’s frequent adoption.  
Concerning the second, more theoretical question on interests and identity, a larger debate exists between liberals and constructivists over what ultimately drives norms’ formal acceptance:  interest-driven incentives or norms that ultimately form part of identity.  Liberals tend to argue that European norms present politicians and other actors with a set of behavior-influencing incentives that ultimately lead to their adoption.  Along these lines, Andrew Moravcsik asserts that these standards tend to only be ratified in functioning democracies possessing the social organization capable of forming various interest groups that then pressure political leaders to adopt such norms.​[19]​  Constructivists, on the other hand, claim that norms actually constitute actors’ identities that, in turn, affect how they define their interests in the first place.​[20]​  Along these lines, Jeffrey Checkel, points to the Ukrainian government’s recent adoption of a more civic-oriented citizenship policy and accordance of cultural autonomy to national minorities  --  changes that could not have stemmed from the only weakly organized interest groups Moravcsik points to.​[21]​ 
While it is certainly important to explain why elites formally adopted minority protections and citizenship policies in line with post-Cold War norms, a key question has been left unanswered  --  the longer-term impact of minority rights conditionality.  There is indeed good reason to question whether elites’ formal acceptance of such norms actually can change average citizens’ sense of social and political obligation to honor them or even the lingering personal prejudices of elites, both important aspects of less conflictual inter-ethnic relations.  After all, the overall emphasis on states choosing to be bound by European norms after 1989 hides certain post-Cold War realities.  Countries situated between Germany and Russia have found themselves in structurally insecure geopolitical positions since the Soviet withdrawal, giving them little choice but to enter key West European security organizations for which the adoption of European standards is required.  Like the League of Nations system from the interwar period, the lack of a genuine choice in formally adopting contemporary norms indicates that minority rights protections in CEECs are not primarily driven less by a domestic give-and-take between minorities and the titular nationality, one more likely to deliver legitimacy to their adoption.  
This paper addresses the next key question  --  specifically, what impact does minority rights conditionality, and to a lesser extent socialization, have on inter-ethnic relations?  This is particularly important now that many CEECs have joined the EU, leaving this institution without its most powerful and effective change-inducing mechanism.  In regard to policy changes made against elites’ and broader societies’ desires, we must also ask whether the minority rights regime always increases the genuine acceptance of these rights.  Furthermore, why in some cases might policy changes spurred by conditionality bring improved inter-ethnic relations, little change, or instead a backlash to the liberal values underlying minority rights?  
Conventional wisdom among many scholars, policy-makers, and especially within the European political elite maintains that the implementation of the contemporary regime will primarily deliver positive results.  The benefits of socialization and especially of EU (and NATO) conditionality seem quite clear in the shift of Latvian and Estonian policy towards their large Russian minorities.  Both countries liberalized initially restrictive citizenship policies allowing only a fraction of their large Russian populations to naturalize automatically in response to EU and NATO membership conditionality.  In rushing to meet these membership obligations, Latvian and Estonian elites went even farther than other CEE elites in satisfying the demands of accession, demands that were not necessarily aligned with societies’ desires.  As Evald Mikkel and Geoffrey Pridham note:  “Latvia and Estonia are characterized by a high discrepancy in EU positions between elite and mass.  The high levels of elite consensus on the need for accession contrasts with the lowest levels of support for EU integration among all accession countries…  The main argument for the majority of Estonians and Latvians was simply choosing ‘the lesser evil.’​[22]​  While likely a function of their former placement within the Soviet Union proper, one that made both countries more desperate to join the West to counter Russian centrist and Eurasianist foreign policy makers’ tendencies to still see Latvia and Estonia in Russia’s immediate sphere of influence, elites’ emphasis on meeting the demands of international institutions also likely stemmed from the greater presence of Western émigrés within post-Cold War governing structures given the forced retirement of the largely-Russian dominated political elite in the early 1990s.​[23]​  The Latvian and Estonian émigré elite embraced Western liberal values to a greater extent than the indigenous elite along with society given their experience living in the West during the socialist  era.
Efforts to adopt contemporary norms have contrasted with both countries’ post-1989 pursuit of ‘ethnic democracy,’ the (re)construction of institutions to ensure the titular nationality’s political dominance.  By disenfranchising many ethnic Russians, for example, the first Estonian parliament elected in 1992 was 100% Estonian  --  voted in by an electorate that went from approximately 65% Estonian in 1990 to over 90% in 1992.​[24]​  The desire to fortify the titular nationalities hardly seems surprising in light of several factors:  (1)  the sharp shift in the distribution of nationalities during the Cold War, leading Russians to increase substantially in proportion to Latvians and Estonians, (2)  Russians’ tendency to dominate the political and economic elite during the Soviet era,​[25]​ and (3)  the fact that Soviet domination in these countries had a strong ethnic flavor given the sizeable import of Russians.  In 1989, Estonia’s population was 61.5% Estonian (down from 88% in 1934) while Latvia’s 77% ethnic Latvian majority in 1935 contrasted with a mere 52% in 1989.​[26]​  The situation is particularly acute in Latvia’s six largest cities wherein the population influx from the Russian interior has made Russians a majority, a situation that diminished the importance of the Latvian language.​[27]​   This explains why the overall share of people able to speak Russian (84.4%) remains higher than those able to speak Latvian (81.7%).​[28]​  Regardless of their forming majorities, both Latvians and Estonians were underrepresented in Soviet era power structures (39.7% of the elite in Latvia and 43.1% in Estonia), though conditions improved during the Gorbachev era.  This picture was sharply reversed in the 1990s.  By 2001, the new electorate was 90% Estonian in Estonia and 78% Latvian in Latvia.​[29]​  Nationalists justified excluding Russian residents from political participation not merely to turn the tables on Russianization, but to give Estonians and Latvians political power beyond their proportions.  
There is good reason to believe that relatively low support for joining the EU and voting ‘yes’ in the referenda on EU entry resulted, in part, from the disjuncture between substantial public support for promoting ethnic democracy and far weaker support for providing ethnic Russians with minimalist post-Cold War protections, leaving the adoption of the regime as the unfortunate means to a much desired end.  Results from the May 2003 Eurobarometer indicated that less than half of Estonians (42%) and Latvians (47%) surveyed thought their country would benefit from joining the EU with 33% of Estonians and 29% of Latvians believed otherwise.​[30]​  Similarly, 42.6% of Estonians voting in the 2003 EU accession referendum supported EU membership as did 48.57% of Latvians.​[31]​  Other reasons for relatively low levels of support include:  (1)  the EU’s excessive regulation that could well put a damper on the Baltic’s high economic growth rates; (2) increased ties with Nordic countries possessing a variety of interest and pressure groups exhibiting relatively strong Euroskepticism;​[32]​  and (3) unhappy memories of being part of a ‘union’ along with glorified pictures of independence during the interwar period.​[33]​  In fact, the Latvian word for union ‘Savieniba’ is used in both the names of the USSR and the EU  --  Padomju Savieniba and Europas Savieniba respectively.​[34]​  
Concerning the Estonian case in particular, rising Euroskepticism in the first half of 2001 was a reflection of unhappiness with government policies.  Given that EU entry was of high priority among ruling elites, the public threatened to withhold its support for accession to punish the government.​[35]​  Public support for EU entry increased following the election of a new president in October 2001, and later in January 2002, with the formation of a new governing coalition.​[36]​  Nevertheless, Merje Feldman wrote in 2001 that “the Estonian government has been widely criticized by both the opposition and the public for ‘giving in’ to western institutions on citizenship and minority rights issues.  Estonia’s leading researchers of ethnicity and citizenship problems note that government efforts at ethnic integration are motivated largely by attempts to appease and deter ‘Eurocrats’ and the international media.”​[37]​  This is in line with 1999 survey results indicating that 63% of ethnic Estonian respondents felt that ethnic Russians “are endangering the preservation of the Estonian nation.”​[38]​  By requiring the implementation of policies allowing easier naturalization of non-Estonians, the EU can then be constructed as a threat to Estonian identity.​[39]​  For a time, in fact, support for EU accession was greater among the country’s Russians than Estonians, with the former being less worried about the perceived dangers EU membership might present to national sovereignty.  This imbalance lasted until July 2001.  Then support among both remained roughly equal to July 2003 when Estonians’ support for entry continually increased and Russians’ decreased.​[40]​
An examination of the impact of minority rights conditionality and socialization in Estonia and Latvia brings mixed results.  The case studies that follow indicate that conditionality and socialization had less of a genuine impact in Latvia in regard to changing attitudes towards Russians, while recent signs in Estonia are a bit more positive.  For Latvia in particular, conditionality-driven liberalization has not deliver decreased tensions in inter-ethnic relations in the longer term, particularly given the fact that now membership conditionality no longer exists as leverage.  This is evident in the lack of change in elite discourse concerning the minority, leaving continuing controversy over recent reforms to phase out Russian-language education in state-run high schools to appear as outright assimilation.  Estonian elites, on the other hand, have gone further in de-securitizing political rhetoric concerning the minority and have done more to mask the assimilatory aspects of the country’s integration program.  Whereas ‘integration’ in Latvian elite discourse means shutting down formal, state-supported Russian-language education along with other incentives to learn Latvian, Estonian elites use the same term to refer to efforts to create more of a multicultural system.  Perhaps having seen the controversies raised by education reform in Latvian, the Estonian government has dropped plans to shift state-supported education solely to Estonian.
Nevertheless, demographic data suggest that Estonian and Latvian worries over cultural survival will hardly disappear.  According the UN Economic Commission, the population of both countries will drop significantly during the next fifty years.  With the lowest fertility rate in Europe at 1.09 child per woman, Latvia’s population is estimated to drop by 31% by this time and Estonia’s by 34%.​[41]​  While Russia’s continued economic and social problems suggest a continued migration of Russians to the Baltic states, Russia’s population too has been declining (by nearly 9 million from 1993-2003)​[42]​ leaving the government to consider ways of encouraging migration.​[43]​  These statistics along with the likelihood of continued out-migration of Estonia’s and Latvia’s young people, suggests a need to introduce these countries to the kind of immigration that has led to concerns over national identity within the western half of Europe.​[44]​

Latvia
The specific cases analyzed here provide an overview of major legislation passed in Estonia and Latvia due overwhelmingly to conditionality, meaning that it had questionable elite and mass support in and of itself:  Latvia’s and Estonia’s amended citizenship and language laws adopted in 1998 and 1999 respectively, a 2001 Estonian amendment dropping language requirements for candidates running in local and parliamentary elections, and Latvia’s 2002 election law that ended requirements for parliamentary candidates to be fluent in Latvian.  Perhaps to cater to two primary constituencies  --  domestic and international audiences  --  liberalizations spurred by conditionality were often followed by reaffirmations of the pursuit of ethnic democracy, particularly in Latvia.  Both cases also include a discussion of recent developments in inter-ethnic relations related to the impact of international institutions pressures on inter-ethnic relations.
Latvia’s citzenship law adopted in 1994 was amended to extend this right to stateless children born after 21 August 1991 and to abolish the ‘window system’ limiting the number who could apply each year (a figure that had been set at .1% of Latvian citizens or about 2,000 depending on their length of residency).​[45]​  While restrictive, this law actually liberalized initial citizenship legislation plans from 1991 that would have given citizenship primarily to those who had held it prior to the Soviet occupation in 1940 as well as their descendents, leaving approximately one third of the country’s population stateless unless they:  could demonstrate sufficient command of Latvian, show familiarity with the constitution, prove residence for 16+ years in the country, and take an oath of allegiance.​[46]​   Given the as-yet undetermined nature of citizenship laws up until 1994, non-citizens faced limitations up until then on receiving state benefits, travel, and on employment.​[47]​  
Such restrictive tendencies ultimately stemmed from political parties’ emphasis on creating an ethnic democracy, one that could undo the injustices of the Soviet past that privileged Russians.  Prominent in this effort were the Fatherland and Freedom party (FF) and the Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK).  It was, in part, due to their absence in the government from the fall of 1993 to late 1995 that helped bring about the 1994 law.  Even more significant was COE conditionality in tandem with OSCE involvement.  OSCE HCNM pressure began in 1993 along with COE criticism after the country’s 1989 language law was amended to require fluency in Latvian for numerous jobs in the public and private sectors in 1992.  Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis then returned the law to parliament for reconsideration, a move that enabled Latvia to join the COE in 1995, not to mention Ulmanis’ overall change in the direction of harmonizing with EU norms.
The 1998 amendments to Latvia’s citizenship law were, by far, the clearest indication of the effectiveness of minority rights conditionality.  Little disagreement exists that the amendments were primarily due to external pressures  --  EU conditionality in particular.  After submitting its EU membership application in 1995, Latvia was excluded from accession talks at the end of 1997 given the slow progress of naturalization.​[48]​  A survey conducted shortly thereafter indicated that a majority of the political elite supported speeding up naturalization by way of liberalization  --  with the exception of FF/LNNK.​[49]​  It was only after a “lengthy and stormy debate,” in fact, that the Latvian Saeima succeeded in its third attempt to adopt the amendments.​[50]​  Urged along by President Guntis Ulmanis, MPs from the ruling Latvian Way party along with the Proprietor (Saimnieks) faction along with a few others prevailed over the fiercely opposed FF/LNNK.​[51]​  
With the end of the window system and the inclusion of stateless children born after 21 August 1991, Latvia could simplify the naturalization process for its then 700,000 non-citizens provided that they can write and talk about everyday topics in the state language and know the country’s constitution and history.​[52]​  The 18,000-20,000 children born to this group since Latvia’s independence would also become citizens provided that their parents publicly demonstrate their consent.​[53]​  Concern existed that omitting the language test for minors might lead to further pressure from Russia and possibly also the West to do the same for others, leading toward a bi-national state rather than an “integrated” one.​[54]​  Such thinking was likely behind reports of a Latvian government commission approving a plan providing cash payments to all ethnic minorities wishing to leave Latvia  --  including $4,000 plus travel expenses according to a Russian government report.​[55]​
The 52% approval for these changes in a referendum signaled significant public support.  Yet, it remains questionable whether the ‘yes’ vote came from the desire to join the EU and NATO and the ensuing requirements of adopting the contemporary minority rights regime, or from a general realization that resident Russians must be accepted.  Guntis Ulmanis’ change of heart concerning citizenship and urging of public debate on the matter no doubt made clear of the necessity of liberalizing citizenship law to join the EU as well as NATO.
To reaffirm its commitment to promote Latvian nationality (perhaps to make up for liberalization to citizenship policy), the Latvian parliament amended the language law in July 1999 formally intended to reverse Soviet-era Russification policy.  With virtually unanimous support from MPs of the three parties comprising the new governing coalition (People’s Party, Latvia’s Way, and the FF/LNNK coalition),​[56]​ the law demanded that public sector and most private sector organizations:  (1)  conduct all record-keeping and official business in Latvian, (2)  conduct all correspondence with the government in Latvian, (3)  use the state language in advertising as well as in conveying information on all issues of general interest (i.e. public health, work safety, employees’ rights), and finally (4) require translation into Latvian all meetings and other public events held in another language (mainly Russian).  For those working in the service sector, both employees and the self-employed must know and use the state language to the extent necessary to perform their duties.  The revised law also required that all public events be conducted in Latvian.
The OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel along with EU External Affairs Commissioner Hans van den Broek criticized the law and tried to delay its passage on the basis of going to far in regulating language use in the private sector.  Along with the OSCE mission in Riga, their criticism “grew harsh ahead of the vote in parliament, to the point of warning Latvia that it would jeopardize its case for admission to the EU by adopting a ‘discriminatory’ law.”​[57]​  However, their efforts succeeded only in getting most fence-sitters to make up their minds.  The vote left only 16 opposed with 73 in favor and 8 abstentions.  Those opposed were unsurprisingly deputies from the group consisting mainly of socialists, communists, and anti-independence activists:  “For Human Rights in a United Latvia.”​[58]​  
Due to external pressure, newly-elected President Vaira Vike-Freiberga returned the language law to parliament for reconsideration.  She criticized the law for going against Latvia’s constitution and international commitments as well as for lacking legal precision.  More specifically, she urged that the law:  (1)  restore Latvian as the country’s dominant language by strengthening its role while allowing speedier integration of non-Latvians by allowing them to use their own languages, and  (2)  omit those parts restricting the education and freedom of expression of non-Latvians, and to allow state interference in the private sphere only when going against the public interest.  On television she made clear the connection between changing the language law and joining Europe’s key international organizations:  “If we have set our sights on Europe, we need to prove ourselves capable of bringing our laws into conformity with European standards…”​[59]​  Parliament approved a revised law on 9 December 1999 that took into account Vike-Freiberga’s criticisms.​[60]​  
Not long afterward, however, the President contradicted these pro-integration efforts and statements in characterizing Latvian’s resident Russian non-citizens as a “wedge” or fifth column that the Russian government could utilize in its alleged planned invasion of Latvia and Estonia.  While such talk was an awkward move to secure influence in the EU and NATO in addition to aid (not to mention contradicting foreign policy orchestrated by the Latvian Foreign Ministry), it showed how easily the elite may move back and forth on the issue of the Russians.  Here, Vike Freiberga’s remarks suggest deportation of the ‘non-natives,’​[61]​ comments that do not bode well for integration.
A final case of liberalization due primarily to minority rights conditionality concerned amendments to Latvia’s electoral laws in May 2002.  These changes eliminated the need for candidates in parliamentary and local elections to demonstrate proficiency in Latvian, thus allowing Russian-speakers with little or no knowledge of the state language to gain office in municipal and district councils as well as in the national parliament.​[62]​  These amendments essentially were a condition of ending the OSCE’ mission in Latvia as well as gaining entry to NATO and were a reaction to EU warnings of potential cooling of relations with Latvia if parliament did not change the election law.​[63]​  The mission’s closure, in particular, signaled OSCE approval of Latvia’s citizenship and language policies.​[64]​  Vike-Freiberga urged for the language proficiency requirement to be dropped beginning in December 2001, a move that was initially resisted by some political parties given upcoming October 2002 parliamentary elections and the potential backlash that would result if they went against previous legislation on Latvian’s status.  To lay the political grounds for change, the parliament strengthened Latvia’s legal provisions excluding the use of other languages in local councils and the national legislature.  This move made the May 2002 liberalization generally acceptable  --  indicated by the absence of protests and pickets on voting day.  With resistance coming mainly from FF MPs, 67 deputies voted for the legislation concerning parliamentary elections and 71 on the law concerning municipal, district, and regional elections.  Latvia’s Way and the People’s party gave robust support to the amendments.  The COE, OSCE, NATO, and the US embassy in Riga applauded their efforts and ultimately removed any remaining obstructions for the commencement of NATO entry negotiations.​[65]​  As with previous liberalizations, this was accompanied by a largely symbolic move to reiterate Latvian’s status as the official language.  In April 2002, the parliament overwhelmingly approved amendments to strengthen the status of Latvian  --  claiming that all individuals have the right to engage with state institutions in Latvian and that Latvian is the parliament’s working language.​[66]​  As Nils Muiznieks, the director of the Latvian Center for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies, noted:  “Latvian politicians are afraid.  On the one hand, they think the Latvian public is stupid.  On the other hand, they fear they will be punished by voters for not defending the Latvian language.  What they did, they decided to go through this whole theater of amending the Latvian Constitution.  They are mostly trying to strengthen the [status of] Latvian as compensation for doing away with these language requirements [in the election law.]”​[67]​
	Ultimately, these three conditionality-inspired liberalizations each resulted in an effort to undo their effects:  first, with the 1999 language law following the 1998 citizenship liberalization; second, with Vike-Freiberga’s labeling of the Russians as a ‘fifth column’ aiding and abetting the Russian government in an alleged attack after supporting changes to the 1999 language law; and finally, with a subsequent amendment in April 2002 that reiterated the Latvian language’s status as the official language in local offices as well as in parliament in response to the changes to the election laws.  One might also interpret Latvian education reforms similarly.  Russian-speaking secondary schools were to switch most of their classes to Latvian in 2004.  By a large majority, in fact, the Latvian parliament passed a law reducing the use of Russian in education in February 2004.  The law requires a minimum of 60% of courses in public schools be taught in Latvian beginning in September 2004.  The government’s primary reasoning for the reform is to promote the integration of minorities.​[68]​  This is indicative of the fact that “the Latvian debate on minority protection is still predominantly a security discourse.  The mainstream political forces continue to regard a large number of Russian-speakers in the country as a serious threat to the Latvian state as well as to the preservation of Latvian language and culture…  The invitation of Latvia to join NATO, which must have reduced external security concerns, has had little effect on the perception of minorities as an internal security problem.”​[69]​  This is likely to continue given continued Russian protests against reform and their recent efforts to unify.
	The reforms, in fact, have both increased Russian efforts to unify and have led to worsening inter-ethnic relations according to a 2004 survey.  Concerning the former, Latvia’s Russian-speakers formed a new organization in September 2004 called the United Congress of the Russian Community in Latvia (OKROL).​[70]​ With about 50,000 registered members, OKROL has become the largest public organization in the EU.​[71]​  It has several aims:  (1)  giving official status for Russian (possibly as a second state language), (2)  acquiring the right to an education in one’s native language, (3)  giving citizenship to all residents, and (4)  the creation of cultural, legal, and economic structures for Russians.​[72]​  Given the two main goals of OKROL  --  to gain civil rights and to oppose the school reform in force as of September 1, 2004 mandating that teaching in Russian not take up more than 40% of school time in Russian secondary schools,​[73]​  the school reform was the main catalyst for the founding of OKROL. 
Nevertheless, economic issues are particularly important to OKROL, particularly given reaction to Russians’ perceived economic prowess.  According to Jakovs Pliners, delegate in OKROL’s congress and member of parliament, “there are lots of Russian-speaking businessmen who wish to come together, to help one another, to shape foreign contacts, to help in building up Russian education and culture.”​[74]​  Since Russian speakers play a significant role in Latvia’s business world, some Latvian politicians along with the media criticize their apparent economic dominance.  Many too suspect that Russian-speaking businessmen have a significant number of ties with Russia.  Latvia’s Russians, in fact, tend to make up nearly half of the country’s approximately 100 millionaires.  
Unsurprisingly, the Latvian government has not warmed to the emergence of OKROL and refuses to register it.  While the refusal likely stems from concerns over potential Russian influence, the government’s case has rested on a technicality, namely two alleged errors in the group’s rules according to OKROL’s co-chairman Mikhail Tyasin.​[75]​  When interviewed about the Russians around the same time, Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga reiterated her emphasis on integration as assimilation: “they must realize that this is an independent country and become Letts of Russian descent, but still Letts.  If they want to be Russians – let them go to Russia.”​[76]​  
	Particularly in response to the education reforms, public opinion results suggest Estonian-Russian relations are worsening, largely as a result of the language reforms.  While a 2004 Baltic Social Sciences Institute (BSZI) survey showed that 84% of Latvian respondents and 82% of their non-Latvians counterparts agree on the need for a unified society allowing different nationalities to live side by side, another 2004 BSZI survey on “The Integration of Young Non-Latvians into Latvia’s Society” showed that 70% of Latvian respondents “get angry when thinking about the way in which Russian speakers are opposing teaching in the Latvian language” and 60% of non-Latvian respondents have negative emotions “when thinking about the way in which Latvians are forcing them to learn the Latvian language.”​[77]​  
While the education reforms are in line with European norms, they  --  along with political rhetoric suggesting that the Russian minority is a security threat  --  are presently the primary bone of contention within domestic Estonian-Russian relations.  As a 2003 report on integration in the Baltics notes:  “the Latvian debate on minority protection is still predominantly a security discourse.  The mainstream political forces continue to regard a large number of Russian-speakers in the country as a serious threat to the Latvian state, as well as to the preservation of the Latvian language and culture.”​[78]​  While the Latvian government has technically followed the demands of the EU and NATO conditionality, evidence does not exist to suggest that thinking has changed concerning ethnic Russians.  Along these lines, OSCE HCNM Rolf Ekeus has had no objections to the presumed necessity of the education reforms.  He understands the need for Latvia’s citizens to know the state language, particularly to help increase the domestic competitiveness of Latvia’s young people.​[79]​  Meanwhile, Vike Freiberga reiterates the non-assimilatory nature of the policy:  “The purpose of the reform is not to assimilate children of other nationalities.  No one has ever forced national minorities in Latvia to give up their language, culture, or national heritage.”​[80]​
Perhaps the problem lies in international institutions not going far enough in developing the regime.  As Will Kymlicka notes:  “the OCE and OSCE norms do not in fact address the challenges raised by national minorities.  There is no discussion of how to resolve (often competing) claims relating to territory and self-government, how to assign official language status and no guarantees that minorities can pursue higher-level education or professional accomplishment in their own language.  States can fully respect these standards and yet centralize power in such a way that all decisions are made in forums controlled by the dominant national group…  In short,  these norms do not address the clash between minority self-government claims and centralizing state policies that generated destabilizing ethnic conflicts in the first place.”​[81]​  While the post-Cold War European minority rights regime has helped to slowly given Latvia’s Russians many of the same rights as ethnic Estonians, it has not significantly diminished the drive towards assimilation, one that continues to bring tensions to Estonian-Russian relations. 

Estonia
The effects of the post-Cold War minority rights regime on Estonian-Russian relations appears mixed  --  yet, shows more beneficial effects on inter-ethnic relations for Latvia.  Conditionality and socialization appear to have augured greater change in elite-level discourse, change that stems from a somewhat less assimilatory understanding of ‘integration.’  The Estonian government made integration a high priority thanks to the 1997 Agenda 2000 report urging the country to integrate Estonia’s Russian speakers, the commencement of accession negotiations, and later NATO’s emphasis on integration in 1999.​[82]​  June 1999 brought the government’s adoption of a document entitled “Bases of the Estonian State Integration Policy” while March 2000 brought the “State Programme ‘Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007,’​[83]​ a plan that was significant in its stated aim at creating a multicultural rather than an ethnic democracy.  The latter document notes that “integration in Estonian society means on the one hand the harmonization of society – the creation and promotion of that which unites all members of society – and on the other hand the opportunity to preserve ethnic differences – the offering to ethnic minorities of opportunities for the preservation of their cultural and ethnic distinctiveness.  What is of significance here is that integration is clearly a bilateral process – both Estonians and non-Estonians participate equally in the harmonization of society.”​[84]​  The program has three main areas of concern:  (1)  linguistic-communicative integration with the general goal of creating “an Estonian language environment,” (2)  legal-political integration with the aim of increasing rates of non-citizens’ naturalization, and (3)  socio-economic integration concerned with raising the economic success of the less competitive northeast.​[85]​  
Both documents were followed in May 2004 by the government’s approval of an integration program specifically for 2004-2007, one that aims to naturalize more than 5,000 people yearly to diminish the country’s still sizeable number of stateless persons (160,000).​[86]​  While ‘integration’ initially signified a unidirectional process wherein non-Estonians were assumed to assimilate to Estonian culture, the reports published in 2000 and 2004 signal that the meaning of integration has shifted to signify general societal integration.​[87]​  Though there may be a clear focus on promoting Estonian language and culture within the integration program, there is more room for difference in Estonian elites’ of integration policy while ‘integration’ for Latvian elites means finding additional ways to make non-Latvians learn the Latvian language.  Moreover, Vike-Freiberga’s remarks certainly have not helped to deliver a more diversity-friendly integration program.
Nevertheless, criticism of Estonia’s program has been raised  --  particularly in regard to the difficulty of passing the language exam, and political support for the overall program had declined by 2003.​[88]​  This may have something to do with the nature of the its emergence.  Rather than being the result of Russian pressure, its birth coincided with the nationalistic upswing in 1999 when Pro Patria returned to power in a coalition government with the Reform Party and the Moderates  --  the latter having gained a significant number of seats.  After having merged with its electoral partner the Estonian National Independence party in 1995, this conservative Christian Democratic party has been the frontrunner in government from 1992-1996 and then again from 1999-January 2002.​[89]​  Pro Patria has consistently and unabashedly promoted assimilation to Estonian culture, but had acceded to Moderates’ interest in developing an integration plan, presuming that the party would be able to influence its content in the direction of pure assimilation.  Beyond the Moderates’ interest in developing a more liberal program, pressures coming from the EU in particular encouraged action.​[90]​  Even after the March 2003 elections brought a new government into office  --  with the newly formed Res Publica leading a coalition with the People’s Union and Reform parties, the ‘European factor’ gave Res Publica an incentive to keep the Ethnic Affairs portfolio  --  one that was important for continuing the integration program given that the portfolio’s minister also chairs the government’s Integration Foundation.​[91]​  Given that Res Publica lacked a definitive policy on integration, media reports suggesting the sacking of the Ethnic Affairs portfolio might have become a reality.​[92]​  
Secondly, survey data show mixed results of efforts to raise the level of Estonian proficiency.  According to the 2000 census, 80% of the population spoke Estonian either as its mother tongue or as a second language while only about 66% claimed the same at the outset of the 1990s.​[93]​  Moreover, David Laitin’s 2002 survey suggests weak integration rather than straightforward assimilation to Estonian culture.  The indicators he points to include the following:  (1)  Estonians surveyed plan to learn Russian more than Finnish or German, (2) nearly 50% of Estonians wish to have Russian as one of the languages for their children to learn, (3) Estonian schoolchildren feel greater cultural similarity with Estonian Russians than their parents did, and (4)  Estonian respondents feel they have more in common with Estonian Russians than with Germans, Finns, or Russia’s Russians.​[94]​  Given that the survey was conducted in areas with high Russian concentrations compared to the rest of the country (Ida Virumaa and Harju), however, one must wonder whether the results apply to the rest of the country.
On the other hand, a 2003 survey commissioned by the Integration Foundation claimed that formal efforts to help Russian-speakers learn the Estonian have not been successful.  Very few of the 251,000 non-Estonians projected to be employed or seeking employment from 2003-2005 possess the required competency in Estonian.  The survey also found that 2/3 of Russian-speaking respondents do not think learning Estonian is necessary for their daily lives, and while 55% want to take the language exam by January 2005, only 14% indicate that they will definitely take it.​[95]​  While the number may well increase given that students taking the exam beginning 1 January 2004 will have all of their tuition expenses reimbursed,​[96]​ this compensation will go only to those individuals already possessing basic knowledge of Estonian  --  a condition of the EU Phare funding aiding this compensation program.​[97]​  Moreover, naturalization rates have generally been declining.  22,773 individuals naturalized in 1996, down to 9,969 in 1998 and 4,534 in 1999.​[98]​ [need recent info]
Third, while Estonian citizenship and minority policy have liberalized thanks to international institutions’ involvement, simultaneous efforts have also been taken to strengthen Estonian identity, perhaps to offset the impact of these pressures  --  or at least to provide the appearance of doing so.  Like Latvia, Estonia’s initial legislation (1992) accorded citizenship only to those who had been citizens prior to the country’s forced annexation to the USSR as well as to their descendents  --  though Estonia’s citizenship law did not include a quota system.  Liberalization came in 1998 on the subject of stateless children, coinciding with the beginning of EU entry negotiations.  Toward the end of the calendar year amendments to the citizenship law passed by a vote of 55-20.​[99]​  Yet, Estonia was quicker to liberalize its local election laws by allowing all permanent residents living in Estonia the right to vote in elections according to the May 1993 Law of Local Elections.  This was not due to international pressure, but likely driven by high percentages of non-Estonians living in certain areas, particularly in Ida-Virumaa county.​[100]​  Most non-Estonians (around 80%), in fact, live in two counties:  one third in Ida-Virumaa and a half in Harju county where they make up 79% and 41% of their respective populations.​[101]​  Given a different demographic makeup, Latvia continued to limit voting in local elections to citizens until under the pressure of international institutions’ conditionality.  
Yet, the Estonian election laws remained controversial in regard to the language proficiency requirements placed on candidates.  They were required to meet the language law’s requirements.​[102]​  After the nationalist-leaning opposition increased its influence in late 1998  --  the same time when Estonia liberalized its citizenship laws enabling those children born of resident aliens in Estonia to receive citizenship without have to take a language test, the language issue in regard to elections became quite important, with the nationalists making it into a campaign issue.​[103]​  A year later the Estonian parliament passed a bill mandating members of all municipal and district councils as well as parliamentary deputies to have enough ability in Estonian to take part “in the assembly’s work and [understand] the contents of legal acts  --  as if, in a way, to compensate for liberalizing citizenship.”​[104]​  These requirements were later dropped, however, once doing so became a condition of NATO entry.​[105]​
Concerning language legislation, it was only after Pro Patria sponsored amendments passed in 1999 that included requiring proficiency in Estonian for employees in the private sector, NGOs as well as for the self-employed that international institutions launched a concerted effort to bring change.  Under relatively intense pressure, the Estonian parliament later passed amendments to language legislation that dropped the Estonian language requirement for jobs in the private sector (even including those with heavy customer contact such as in stores); yet, maintained the requirement for those in ‘vital’ positions within the service and public sectors.​[106]​  These changes were met with praise from the EU, with EU enlargement minister Gunter Verheugen claiming that the language law was thus completely in line with OSCE and EU norms.​[107]​  However, this did not keep the Interior Ministry from considering repatriation of Russians.  A draft repatriation proposal was leaked to the press in September 2000.  Composed by Jaak Valge, the head of the ministry’s department responsible for dealing with aliens, the document recommended repatriating all aliens considered “ill-adjusted and not integrated into Estonian society.”​[108]​  The government then backtracked in claiming that the proposal is not the Interior Ministry’s official policy.​[109]​  
The next liberalization came with the end of language requirements for candidates running for office in parliament and in local councils noted earlier.  Passed in November 2001 by a vote of 55 to 21 with one abstention, the changes led the head of the OSCE’s mission to recommend closure.  The day before parliament passed a bill that would counter the effects of such legislation.  Proposed by the Pro Patria Union, the bill declared Estonian as the body’s working language by a vote of 68 to 0 with 1 abstention, legislation that was motivated by a desire to balance the abolishment of Estonian for candidates in the parliament and local council elections.​[110]​  It was followed by a bill making Estonian the official language in local councils passed in early December 2001, requiring official documents and council sessions to be in Estonian.  However, another language may be used if it is the language of the locality’s majority, provided that the government gives its permission.​[111]​
While Res Publica proposed further liberalizing citizenship  --  to give it to those resident since August 1991 who complete civics courses,​[112]​ representatives of Estonia’s eight largest parties formally agreed in January 2003 not to relax Estonia’s citizenship and language policies regardless of who gains entry into the government after the March parliamentary elections.​[113]​  However, an October 2003 Supreme Court decision relaxed citizenship restrictions by ruling that resident Soviet and Russian veterans must be allowed to receive permanent residency permits, rather than five-year permits.​[114]​
Despite simultaneous urges to meet international institutions’ demands and further Estonian identity, signs nevertheless exist to indicate the more positive impact of minority rights conditionality as well as socialization in Estonia.  While the Estonian media has not provided a particularly positive view on the government’s integration program and political support for the program weakened in 2003,​[115]​ media discourse has shifted in its characterization of minorities.  While Russian speakers have been referred to as ‘colonizers,’ ‘occupants,’ ‘aliens,’ and ‘illegal immigrants’  --  all questioning their loyalty to an independent Estonia, recent change in this discourse has been characterized as “’discovering’ the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia.”​[116]​   Changing sentiment has also come from academics and politicians signaling that the Russian- and Estonian-speaking populations are at a point in which integration is thinkable.  Merje Feldman claims that “Estonians feel that their state and culture are no longer threatened whereas non-Estonians have come to terms with the collapse of the Soviet Union and have given up hopes for automatic citizenship or acceptance of Russian as the second official language.”​[117]​  Yet, Feldman questions whether the Estonian language press reflects greater tolerance.​[118]​
Results of public opinion surveys indeed suggest improved Estonian views on integration.  When asked ‘who should be citizens?’ in 1995 and 2000, noticeably more Estonian respondents selected the requirement of being born in Estonia in 2000  --  36% compared to 29% in 1995 (though the percentage claiming that all those resident for 10+ years should be citizens had dropped from 30% in 1995 to 21% in 2000).​[119]​  When asked to evaluate Estonian citizenship policy in 1994, 1997, and 2000, fewer respondents over time indicated that it was “too lenient, harmful to the interests of the Estonian nation:”  36% in 1994, 24% in 1997, and 21% in 2000.​[120]​  Surveys from 1996 and 2000 showed a decrease in support for encouraging non-Estonians to leave the country.  Whereas 75% thought “that the Estonian state should support or promote non-Estonians in leaving Estonia” in 1996, 46% agreed “that ‘it would be beneficial for Estonia in case non-Estonians leave or emigrate’” (sic) in 2000.​[121]​  Yet, these surveys showed little change in the number of respondents questioning non-Estonians loyalty (49% in 1996 and 45% in 2000).​[122]​  Finally, a 2000 survey showed that nearly 75% of respondents saw some benefit to diversity.​[123]​
More recently, integration in the area of education also looks a less overtly like assimilation in Estonia.  In June 1993, the Estonian parliament passed the Law on Basic and Secondary Schools mandating Estonian as the singular language of instruction all state-run secondary schools by 2000.  While the COE and OSCE both urged change since its passage in 1993, it was not until later in September 1997 when parliament amended the law to postpone the full implementation of instruction in Estonian to 2007 in Russian-language secondary schools  --  thanks to the European Commission’s initial Agenda 2000 report in July 1997 criticizing the government’s plan to close Russian-language secondary schools.​[124]​  Beyond the exercise of straightforward conditionality, Elena Jurado has pointed to other factors in domestic politics that explain why the government became more receptive to change.​[125]​  The government went even further in January 2000 by proposing an amendment that would allow up to 40% of courses to be taught in a minority language without a planned phasing out of the program.​[126]​  2002 amendments later discarded the mandatory transition to Estonian, even after 2007.​[127]​  By going beyond the EU’s expectations, Jurado claims that OSCE socialization and COE emphasis on taking an ethical approach to minority rights have been effective in bringing genuine change in elite attitudes.  
While such change is indeed difficult to verify, the Estonian government’s report entitled “Integrating Estonia 1997-2000” notes that Estonian voters have been voting less frequently along national lines since the 1999 local elections.​[128]​  Stephen Day and Jo Show point to additional indicators of decreasing distrust between the two nationalities:  Pro Patria’s step down as the main governing party, the “ongoing merger of Russian and Estonian parties,” and the less nationalistic approaches of recent governing coalitions.​[129]​  Ultimately, such an approach has led to a lesser degree of protest than Latvia has witnessed in response to education reform.  Instead of increased signs of Russian speakers mobilization (as indicated by the formation of OKROL in Latvia), Russian mobilization in Estonia shows signs of weakening.  Following the March 2003 parliamentary elections, no Russian parties were able to gain representation in the Estonian parliament  --  down from the six seats Russian nationalist parties gained in the 1999 elections.  Neither the Russian Party of Estonia with its miniscule 0.18% win nor the United People’s Party with 2.1% of the vote could meet the 5% threshold.​[130]​  Both parties programs had focused on liberalizing Estonia’s citizenship and language laws as well as on social problems.  While local analysts claimed the immediate cause was the preceding visit by Lyubov Sliska of United Russia, a State Duma deputy  --  suggesting Moscow’s support, the fact that only 170,000 ethnic Russians of Estonia’s 500,000 Russian speakers were eligible to vote could not help but play a role (though clearly not a decisive one given previous successes).​[131]​  
What this information ultimately suggests is that conditionality and socialization had a greater genuine impact on Estonia, leading to a shift in general and especially elite attitudes toward the Russian minority.  Nor has Estonia chosen to take Latvia’s harder line on education reform  --  thus diminishing prospects for Russian mobilization.  While good reason exits to attribute all of these changes to international institutions’ involvement, evidence exits to suggest that Estonia was more open to multiculturalism to begin with.  For example, the 1992 Constitution has provisions for cultural autonomy.  For example, individuals have the right to be responded to in their language by local governments and state agencies in places where over half of the permanent residents identify with a national minority.  While only citizens can be part of the ‘national minority,’ the Constitution makes allowances for areas in with the language of the majority is not Estonian, thus allowing permanent residents to qualify.​[132]​  Yet, this does not follow from the recent past.  Anton Steen has noted that the Estonian elite tended to be more confrontational during portions of the earlier 1990s, likely due to the following factors:  the sizeable increase of Russian settlers following significant deportations after World War II, the harshness of the period of Soviet occupation, and the lack of integration between the Estonian and Russian communities.​[133]​  Given the more homogenous nature of Estonian society, the deportation of Estonians and the immigration of Russians had to have been difficult.​[134]​  This has resulted in a significantly lower number of mixed marriages in Estonia than Latvia  --  8.8% compared to 19.9%.​[135]​  Perhaps knowledge of these differences led Estonian elites to proceed with greater caution  --  after the initial, post-Soviet nationalizing phase had subsided.

Conclusion
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